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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2(3)0) and 78-2-2(4). 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
ISSUE 1. Must summary judgment for Hokeiko be affirmed because 
"conditions precedent" to the "Settlement Agreement" as a whole had not been meet? R. 
479. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The interpretation of a contract is reviewed for 
correctness. Gibbs M. Smith, Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 949 P.2d 337, 
340 (Utah 1997). However, Utah courts "will also endeavor to uphold a trial court's 
ruling, even if we must consider alternative grounds on which the court below did not 
rely." O'Neal v. Division of Family Servs.. 821 P.2d 1139, 1141 (Utah 1991)(affirming 
dismissal ruling reviewed for correctness); see also, Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assoc, 
752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988)("we may affirm trial court decisions on any proper 
ground(s), despite the trial court's having assigned another reason for its ruling"); City 
Elec. v. Industrial Indem. Co., 683 P.2d 1053, 1060 (Utah 1984)(same). 
ISSUE 2. Must summary judgment for Hokeiko be affirmed because the trial 
court correctly ruled, on undisputed facts, that Hokeiko properly terminated the 
"Settlement Agreement" according to its terms? R. 467, 475. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The interpretation of a contract is reviewed for 
correctness. Id. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
No statute or rule is inherently determinative in this contract action. Pertinent 
sections of statutes or rules cited shall be set forth as they are referenced. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a contract action. It involves the enforceability and application of separate 
"Settlement Agreements" between appellant Isaac Max Jaramillo (doing business as 
Channel Twenty Television Company ("CTTC")) and Hokeiko, and between Jaramillo 
and Lawrence Rogow dba Front Range Broadcasting Company ("Rogow"). The trial 
court, Judge Wilkinson then presiding, ruled on summary judgment that CTTC could not 
enforce the "Settlement Agreements," which Hokeiko and Rogow had terminated. R. 
1144, 1146. Appellants only appeal the grant of Hokeiko's two motions for summary 
judgment and the denial of CTTC's cross-motion for summary judgment. R. 1158. They 
do not appeal the Rogow judgment that included similar, more detailed rulings on 
identical contract terms. R. 1146; 1180 at 18. 
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. The FCC Applications and Settlement Agreement 
CTTC filed an application with the Federal Communications Commission 
("FCC") for a construction permit for a new UHF television station on Channel 20 in Salt 
Lake City. R. 470 f^ 1; 640 ^ 1 . Hokeiko also filed a competing application with the FCC 
at about the same time. R. 471 Tf3; 640 f "1-3". Still others applied for the permit. R. 
4711J6; 640^6. 
To improve its position as an applicant, CTTC presented Hokeiko with a 
"Settlement Agreement" (the "Agreement") which both parties signed on or about 
December 14, 1995. R. 11; 4711f4; 640 f 4. (A copy of the Agreement is attached to 
CTTC's brief as Addendum "A". The Agreement will be cited as "Agreement 1f _ " ) . 
Through a "Joint Request," Hokeiko and CTTC asked for FCC approval of the 
Agreement and dismissal of Hokeikofs competing application. R. 471 %5; 640 [^5. CTTC 
attempted to consolidate its position to eliminate remaining applicants for the permit 
through similar agreements. R. 21; 31; 471 f6; 640 ^6} 
The Agreement was "conditioned upon" the existence of four "'conditions 
precedent'". (Agreement f 3.) The Agreement also provided that "either [p]arty may 
terminate this Settlement Agreement" under certain time-dependent conditions, after 
which "[Hokeiko] shall be entitled to resume prosecution of its application." Agreement 
TJ13. Paragraph 13-the termination clause-states: 
If the Commission or its delegate for any reason fails to approve this 
Settlement Agreement, to grant the CTTC application, and to dismiss the 
competing applications within twelve months after the submission of the 
Joint Petition requesting such approval; or, if approved, such actions do not 
become Final Orders, then either Party may terminate this Settlement 
Agreement upon ten days' written notice to the other, following which 
Hokeiko shall be entitled to resume prosecution of its application. 
1
 Jaramillo later asked the FCC to substitute appellant, Channel Twenty Television 
Company, a limited liability company, as the applicant "contingent upon the [FCC's] approval of 
the settlement agreements filed December 14, 1995 in this [the Channel 20] proceeding." R. 
484, emphasis supplied. The company is also the appellant. 
(Agreement j^ 13, emphasis supplied.) 
B. Hokeiko's Termination of the Settlement Agreement and FCC Action 
Almost 20 months after CTTC and Hokeiko filed the Joint Request (in August 
1997), FCC staff broadcast analyst Selina Ayers telephoned Hokeiko's FCC legal 
counsel, Irving Gastfreund, to inquire into the status of the Channel 20 submissions. R. 
509, TJ 5.2 Mr. Gastfreund informed her that Hokeiko may terminate the Agreement and 
withdraw from the Joint Request, but that nothing as yet had been filed to affect FCC 
consideration of the Joint Request. R. 510, ^5. 
Mr. Gastfreund spoke again with the FCCs Ms. Ayers on October 8, 1997, almost 
22 months after filing the Joint Request. R. 510, Tf6. Mr: Gastfreund informed her that 
Hokeiko was that day terminating the Agreement and filing a withdrawal from the Joint 
Request. R. 510, f 6. Hokeiko simultaneously notified CTTC of its termination (R. 510, 
f7; 516) and filed with the FCC its withdrawal from the Joint Request, advising the FCC 
that Hokeiko would renew pursuit of its competing application for the Channel 20 permit. 
R. 510-11,1J8; 520; 522. 
It was assumed for purposes of summary judgment that, without prior notice to the 
applicants, the FCC granted the Joint Request on October 6,1997, two days before 
Hokeiko's withdrawal. The FCCs ruling accepted the Agreement, granted Jaramillo's 
2
 Appellants say that it was Mr. Gastfreund who "contacted a staff member of the FCC". 
CTTC Brief at 3. For this, appellants cite Mr. Gastfreund's affidavit which actually states that 
Selina Ayers "telephoned me and inquired as to the status of the Channel 20 settlement . 
submissions to the FCC." (R. 509, \S9 italics added.) Appellants did not contradict Mr. 
Gastfreund. 
application, and dismissed Hokeikofs. R. 524. It was undisputed that the FCC ruling was 
released on Public Notice, Report No. 44097, on or about October 15, 1997. R. 513. 
It was also undisputed that before October 1997 the FCC had not approved the 
Joint Request and that more than 12 months had past after it was filed (December 1995) 
with the FCC. R. 473 Tf 11; 641 f l l ; 511 ]9. 
CTTC challenged Hokeikofs renewed pursuit of the permit and offered a payment 
"if Hokeiko will get back on board." R. 527. Then, in an admitted effort to prevent 
Hokeiko from petitioning the FCC to reconsider its ruling, Channel Twenty Television 
Company (the LLC, not CTTC, Jaramillo's dba) filed this state court action, requesting a 
restraining order. R. 60. The trial court, Judge Iwasaki then presiding, rejected the 
request, allowing Hokeiko to file its petition for reconsideration with the FCC. R. 195.3 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court correctly granted summary judgment for Hokeiko and denied 
CTTC's motion based on alternative grounds. First, Hokeiko was entitled to resume 
prosecution of its application for the FCC construction permit because the unambiguous 
"conditions precedent" to the formation of the Agreement (Agreement f^ 3) had not 
occurred. The facts were undisputed. Thus, Hokeiko was free to end the arrangement. 
3
 Appellants did not question that after an FCC order, decision, or action issues, "any 
party thereto, or any other person aggrieved or whose interests are adversely affected thereby, 
may petition for reconsideration " 47 U.S.C.A. § 405(a) (1991). See also, e.g., Red River 
Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. FCC, 98 F.2d 282, 286 (D.C. Cir. 1938) (addressing petition for 
rehearing before the FCC and noting that "[t]he right to administrative relief is a privilege 
afforded by law to persons who consider themselves interested or aggrieved.") Appellants never 
disjputpd these authorities and do not appeal Judge Iwasaki's ruling. R. 1158. 
\ 
Second, even if all conditions precedent to an enforceable Agreement had been 
i 
met, summary judgment for Hokeiko was proper because Hokeiko correctly terminated 
the Agreement under Paragraph 13. Contrary to CTTC's contention (improperly raised 
for the first time on appeal), the termination terms are not ambiguous. Under these terms, ' 
Hokeiko correctly terminated the Agreement, and was free to pursue the FCC permit, for 
alternative reasons: (1) the FCC had not "approved" the parties' submissions within 12 ^ 
months; (2) Hokeiko terminated before the effective date of the FCC ruling; and (3) the 
FCC's actions had not become "Final Orders". Agreement f 13. CTTC could not 
i 
"waive" the "Final Order" requirement and prevent termination because the Agreement's 
finality terms also benefitted Hokeiko. Here too, the facts were not disputed. 
The trial court correctly rejected CTTC's other claims and defenses. CTTC's 
"reading" of Paragraph 13 is grammatically flawed and collides with the Agreement's 
language. CTTC's pre-termination breach and "estoppel" claims fail because CTTC 
failed to carry its burden on summary judgment to produce admissible evidence capable 
of creating a genuine issue of fact. The trial court's summary judgment ruling was 
correct. 
ARGUMENT ' 
I. Introduction 
Twice the trial court construed language of the CTTC-drafted "Settlement 
Agreements." Twice CTTC could not reconcile its claims (and contract-construction 
theories) with the Agreement's language, which CTTC then cast as unambiguous. And 
twice the trial coin 11 i ilecl tl lat the tei minating parties (I lokeiko and R ogov • ) coi nplied 
with the agreements. R. 1144, 1146.4 
Leaving the judgment for Rogow unchallenged, (which judgment now governs 
that agreement), CTTC appeals only the trial court's ruling on Hokeiko's Agreement. 
CTTC now implies there is ambiguity (for the first time on appeal), while elsewhere 
ignoring grounds underlying the ti ial ecu ii t's i ulings I lowever, C 11 C's argi in lents, e v ei i 
as newly cast, cannot change the Agreement's terms. Under those terms, the Agreement 
as a whole was ineffective because conditions precedent to its formation had not been 
met, and, in all events, it was correctly terminated, as the trial court ruled. CTTC cannot 
explain away tl ic • termination provision which benefits Hokeiko (not in^t PTTf^ and that 
CTTC cannot waivr Finnllv , < VV'V< n,: i miquely-applied "e> < t^ °- . ^ 1 * C 
no help for lack of evidence and because the FCC's decision was already non-final, 
allowing Hokeiko to terminate long before Hokeiko petitioned the FCC. Summary 
judgment for Hokeiko should be affirmed. 
II. Unsatisfied Conditions Precedent Permitted Hokeiko to Resume 
Pursuit of the FCC Construction Permit 
CTTC crafted the Agreement so CTTC would have no risk and no obligation 
unless and until it was guaranteed success as applicant for the FCC permit. Thus, it 
conditioned the formation of the Agreement as a whole on four "conditions precedent." 
Agreement* rTTC phrased it this way in Paragraph 3: 
^
 4 ( 1 1 T ( ' ackn< »\\ ledged th;tl both agreements weie "essentially identical ' K I I SO j \ i 8. 
i 
This Settlement Agreement is conditioned upon, and the obligation of 
CTTC to make the payment required pursuant to Paragraph 1 of this 
Settlement Agreement shall not arise unless and until, the following 
conditions are met [sic] hereafter "conditions precedent"): 
a. An Order has been issued and has become a Final 
Order dismissing with prejudice the [Hokeiko] application for 
Channel 20 in Salt Lake City and approving this Settlement 
Agreement. 
b. An Order has been issued and has become a Final 
Order (or separate Orders have been issued and have become 
Fined Orders) dismissing with prejudice the FRBC and KM 
applications. 
c. An Order has been issued and has become a Final 
Order granting the application of CTTC. 
d. All of the terms and conditions of this Settlement 
Agreement have been met. 
(Emphasis supplied.) These "conditions precedent" to the formation of the Agreement 
are unambiguous (and CTTC claimed no ambiguity). CTTC defined "Final Orders" to 
refer to FCC rulings on the relevant points that were beyond challenge by petitioning the 
FCC for reconsideration or by other means. Agreement f^ 2. 
CTTC did not dispute that the Final Orders (conditions precedent "a" through "d") 
never occurred as of the time Hokeiko renewed pursuit of its application or even when 
summary judgment was granted. See e ^ , R. 1179 at 36, 60. And because these events 
on which the Agreement as a whole was "conditioned" had not occurred, Hokeiko was 
free to end the anangement. Professors Calamari & Parillo explained the rule this way: 
[A] condition precedent to the existence of a contract [is] usually 
called a condition precedent to the formation of a contract. 
In that situation the contract itself does not arise unless and until the 
condition occurs. This means that the pai ;: 
arrangement until the condition occurs. 
John D. Calamari & Joseph M. Parillo, Contracts §11-5 (3rd ed. 1987)(footnotes omitted). 
The rule is followed in Utah and elsewhere. See Car Doctor. Inc., v. Belmont, 635 P.2d 
82, 84 (Utah 1981)(partnership did not come into existence where express conditions 
were not i net); Wade v. Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co.. 700 P.2d 1093 1096 (1 It: it i 1985)(no 
insurance policy arose or was binding where condition precedent was not fulfilled) Sec 
also Oppenheimer & Co., Inc.. v. Oppenheim, Appel Dixon & Co.. 660N.E.2d415,421 
(N.Y. 1995)(holding that contract did not arise when express condition precedent was 
unmet). See also K, I I SO at ;'" !i (CTTC acknowledging the correctness of condition-
precedent ai ithoi i ties). 
Although Hokeiko established the "conditions precede! it" of Paragraph 3 as ai I 
alternative basis for summary judgment (R. 479-80), CTTC ignores the point on appeal as 
it did in its memoranda below; CTTC has never briefed the issue. Any effort by CTTC to 
raise or develop some argument now-for the first time in a reply brief-should not be 
considered becai ise it contra^ < ei les I. J'tali R A pp. P. 24(c)' \ 1 licl I lin lits the repl> brief "to 
answering any new matter set forth in the opposing brief." See e^, McDougal v. Weed, 
945 P.2d 175, 179 n.3 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)(declining to consider argument raised first in 
appellant's reply brief)(emphasis supplied). 
In si in I, I lokeiko could resume pursuit of the FCC permit because at the time of the 
Agreement were not met and there was no binding contract. The trial court correctly 
granted summary judgment for Hokeiko despite any perceived harshness to CTTC, the 
Agreement's author.5 See e.g., Oppenheimer, 660 N.E.2d at 419, citing Maxton Bldrs. V. 
Lo Galbo. 502 N.E.2d 184, 189 (N.Y. 1986)(where no contract arose due to unmet 
condition precedent, court noted that if the parties "are dissatisfied with the consequences 
of their agreement, 'the time to say so [was] at the bargaining table.'"); Jones v. ACME 
Bldg. Prods., Inc.. 22 Utah 2d 202, 206, 450 P.2d 743, 746 (Utah 1969) citing Ephraim 
Theatre Co.. v. Hawk. 7 Utah 2d 163, 166, 321 P.2d 221, 223 (Utah 1958)("Generally 
speaking, neither of the parties, nor the court has any right to ignore or modify conditions 
which are clearly expressed merely because it may subject one of the parties to hardship, 
but they must be enforced 'in accordance with the intentibn as . . . manifested by the 
language used by the parties to the contract.'") 
III. Summary Judgment Should be Affirmed Because the Trial Court 
Correctly Ruled, On Undisputed Facts, that Hokeiko Properly 
Terminated the "Settlement Agreement." 
Even if all conditions precedent to the formation of the Agreement had been met 
(and they had not), summary judgment for Hokeiko should be affirmed on alternative 
grounds. First, the terms of Paragraph 13 are not ambiguous and CTTC's unpreserved 
claim of ambiguity (argued for the first time on appeal) should be rejected. Second, 
Hokeiko correctly terminated the Agreement and was free to pursue the FCC permit 
because (1) the FCC had not "approved" the parties' submissions within 12 months and 
5Construing the same language in Rogow's agreement, the trial court noted that it could 
not "rewrite" the agreement and held, on "undisputed" facts, that the agreement had not become 
valid and enforceable against Rogow "[b]ecause none of the conditions precedent upon which the 
Agreement is conditioned has been met " R. 1148. CTTC does not appeal this ruling. 
approval was nol iTIaliVT, and alkTiiafiwh , (? I llir FCC's actions had not bn/ufiic: 
"Final Orders". Agreement Tfl3. The facts were not disputed. 
CTTC's Unpreserved "Ambiguity" Claim Should be Rejected. 
CTTC now grounds all its contract construction arguments on the premise that 
Paragraph 1 3 has becon le an lbiguoi is. CTTCbi ief at 10 15 Raising this as its' "'threshold 
quest ion," C T T C asks the <^o - » "infer" facts ami m t u i l b e y o n d I lie- plain l an^uagi „ 
saying that its reading o f the Agreement (that w o u l d bar H o k e i k o ' s termination) is 
"reasonable" and, thus, summary judgment based on H o k e i k o ' s s imilarly reasonable 
interpretation w a s improper. < ^ T T C brief at 10. H o w e v e r , C T T C ' s ambigui ty argument 
construed the A g r e e m e n t ' s unambiguous terms, ho ld ing that terminatioi I w a s pi :>per. 
C T T C did not argue on summary judgment that Paragraph 13 w a s ambiguous or 
required extrinsic ev idence because it w a s subject to t w o "reasonable" interpretations T o 
the direct contrary, C T T C urged the trial court to construe the A g r e e m e n t as a matter o f 
law. JR 637, 656 ( 71 1 C argued that tl le Agi een lei it wa s not an ll »< nn ms ai »d that 
discovery w a s unnecessary to dec ide the parties' mot ions . S e e R. 11 /y A•• ' •-* I < 1 1 C 
arguing: "I think it 's fairly clear that in order for a prov is ion to b e ambiguous , it has to be 
subject to t w o reasonable interpretations. A n d I 'm g o i n g to s h o w y o u w h y our [CTTC's ] 
interpretation oil that c lause is reasonable and w h y theirs [ H o k e i k o ' s ] is not."); R. 784 
than o n e reasonable interpretation, the language o f paragraph 13 c a n n o t be sa id to b e 
1 1 
ambiguous."); R. 656 (addressing the 12-month termination provision of Paragraph 13, 
CTTC argued that: "[o]n this point, the language of the Settlement Agreement is quite 
clear "); R. 1179 at 9 (answering the trial court's question whether CTTC wanted 
certain discovery before addressing summary judgment, CTTC argued: "We don't believe 
that it's necessary. We believe their motion fails on its face [for] reasons apart from that 
discovery."). See also R. 1179 at 13-14 (trial court noting it would continue the hearing 
to permit certain discovery but "counsel [for CTTC] says . . . it's not necessary as far as 
proceeding today with the summary judgment motion.").6 
Further, CTTC does not cite in the record where its ambiguity argument was 
preserved (and it was not preserved), and CTTC offers no exceptional circumstance or 
statement of grounds in its opening brief "for seeking review of an issue not preserved in 
the trial court," as court rules require. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5). 
Because CTTC did not preserve its new "ambiguity" argument, which overlays 
CTTC's contract construction claims, these arguments should not be considered for the 
first time on appeal. See e ^ , IntT Union of Bricklayers Local Union No 20, v. Martin 
Jaska, Inc., 752 F.2d 1401, 1404-05 (9th Cir. 1985) (court rejected unpreserved ambiguity 
argument and affirmed summary judgment, noting: "The record is devoid of any 
indication that these factual issues were brought to the attention of the trial court. To the 
6Because CTTC did not raise "ambiguity" before the trial court, it can hardly assign error, 
as it does, to any alleged failure "to determine whether CTTC's interpretation of the Settlement 
Agreement was reasonable" as well. CTTC brief at 11. Further, as shown below, CTTC's 
interpretation is unreasonable and collides with the Agreement's language and was correctly 
rejected by the trial court as a matter law. 
conlrai"), the teeoui nn'caL (IMI | a|>|H;Jlant] represented to the trial court that the import of 
the contract was 'unmistakenly clear', denied reliance 01 1 extei rial evidence., and invited 
the court to construe the [agreement] as a matter of law."); Utah Medical Prods., Inc., v. 
Searcy, 958 P.2d 228, 233-34 (Utah 1998) ("We do not address issues raised for the first 
time on appeal unless specific grounds for doing so are presented to this court."); Trayner 
v. Gushing, (iKS V \\ NSoti 8 V,' (I Kali I'W h|ulssm\s not presented to the trial court for 
decision are not reviewable by this Court, and we express no opinio )ii on the 
issue.")(footnote omitted). 
B, Hokeiko Correctly Terminated Under Unambiguous Terms. 
The Agreement had key, time-contingent termination rights that applied equally to 
both parties. ItilhiT Hokeiko oi ('TT("' could terminate llie Agreement, and not be held 
indefinitely, if final FCC action did not occur within an agreed pei i< KI Agreement ]\ i 5. 
The right to terminate existed if the FCC, for any reason, "failed to approve" the 
Agreement and dismiss all competing applications within 12 months following the 
December 1995 submission of the parties' Joint Request. Agreement Tf 13. And even if 
the FCC had "approved" the loint R ecp iest w ithin t\ v el\ e i i lonths, termination "\v as still 
allowed if all required FCC actions had not become "Final Orders". Agreement fflf 2, 13. 
Here is the controlling language of Paragraph 13: 
If the Commission or its delegate for any reason fails to approve this 
Settlement Agreement, to grant the CTTC application, and to dismiss the 
competing applications within twelve months after the submission of the 
Joint Petition requesting such approval; or, if approved, such actions 
do not become Final Orders, then either Party may terminate this 
Settlement Agreement upon ten days5 written notice to the other, 
I 
following which Hokeiko shall be entitled to resume prosecution of its 
application. 
(Emphasis Supplied.) Hokeiko correctly terminated under these terms in October 1997, 
almost twenty two months after the Joint Request was submitted. R. 516. 
1. Termination Was Proper Because the FCC Did Not "Approve" the 
Joint Request Within Twelve Months. 
Paragraph 13 expresses the parties' agreement to accord the FCC twelve full 
months to deliberate and approve the parties' submissions through "Final Orders" with no 
right to terminate in the interim. However, if all these FCC actions did not occur in one 
year, the parties were free to (but not required to) terminate the arrangement at any point 
and pursue their own applications.7 They become competitors once more. 
CTTC concedes that the FCC did not approve the Joint Request within the defined 
twelve-month period (on or before January 15, 1997). R. 1179 at 60. Thus, under 
Paragraph 13, both Hokeiko and CTTC could terminate any time after January 15,1997, 
as a matter of law. 
Even if the FCC had acted within 12 months (and it did not), Hokeiko correctly 
terminated because FCC "approval" of the Settlement Agreement occurred after Hokeiko 
terminated. As a matter of law, the FCC Letter Ruling dated October 6, 1997, had no 
effect as an approval before the FCC gave public notice of the order. See 47 C.F.R. § 
1.103(a) (1997) ( "[T]he effective date of any Commission action shall be the date of 
7To this extent, Hokeiko agrees that the Agreement was not "self-terminating". See 
CTTQ brief at 13. The termination option remained after the twelve months. Agreement \ 13. 
piilliK notice of such action . . . . ) (emphasis supplied). Termination was valid because 
the October 8th ten i lination oc ci in edbefoi e tl le Oc tobei 15th effecti\ e date of tl le I ;"CC 
approval. Thus, CTTC errs as a matter of law in suggesting (again withoiil a;t ithorit} ) 1 h; it 
the FCC letter ruling dated October 6 "effectuates a dismissal of Hokeiko's competing 
application.' CTTC brief at 14. 
C ! t ;-. p • ? n awav the applicable FCC rule simply by calling it 
"technical" <r * •..• •- ' inf the ,k|Miipos<1" o| «i ijiffetnit uile, as il 'lit) ID llie 
trial court. R. 654. As CTTC acknowledged, the rule governs "Effective Dales of 
Commission Actions." R. 655. The parties agreed that the rule would also govern here. 
See Agreement ^ 7 (the Settlement Agreement is "governed and construed under the laws 
o t ; mnications Act »; •*. as amended, and the 
Commission's Rules and ^ -• f >97, feiininalioii notice 
signaled the end of the Agreement according to its terms. 
2 Termination was Also Effective Because No FCC Actions Became 
"Final Orders." 
Even il the i C ( had "approved" the submissions during the twelve-month period 
(and il did u*»0, "in v\'tm if j(\
 (ippi(nii( ilnl i|iii irijuiu' puMk until » of i ouM occur later to 
block termination (and it cannot), Hokeiko's termination remained <i inulla ol n^hl 
because no pre-termination FCC action became a "Final Order". See Agreement ]\ 13 
(noting termination is allowed even if the FCC "approved" the submissions where "such 
Again, CTTC does not address this in its principal brief. 
( 
actions do not become Final Orders "). This established another ground for 
( 
termination. 
Though lengthy and somewhat cumbersome, the definition of "Final Orders" 
broadly encompasses FCC action that was beyond attack by petitioning the FCC for 
reconsideration or by other means: 
A "Final Order" for purposes of this Settlement Agreement means an Order \ 
of the Commission (or any of its officials acting pursuant to delegated 
authority) as to which the time for filing a petition for reconsideration, 
application for review or a court appeal, and the time within which the 
Commission may review said Order on its own motion, have [sic] expired 
and no such petition for reconsideration, application for review or court 
appeal has been timely filed and the Commission has not reviewed said 
Order on its own motion or, in the event of any such petition, application, 
appeal or action being filed or taken, such petition application, appeal or 
action shall have been disposed of and the time for seeking further review 
of the Commission's Order shall have expired without any request for such 
further review having been filed. 
Agreement If 2. Flokeiko's termination complied with Paragraph 13 and this definition. 
a. No "Final Order" had issued. 
No FCC actions on the parties' submissions became "Final Orders" before 
Hokeiko gave the contractually-authorized notice of termination. CTTC does not contend 
that the "time for filing a petition for reconsideration" had expired. Further, CTTC does 
not dispute that on November 12, 1997, following issuance of the FCC's order dated 
October 6, 1997, Hokeiko timely filed its Petition for Reconsideration with the FCC to 
challenge the order. And because Hokeiko's petition had not "been disposed of and the 
time for seeking further review" had not expired as of the time summary judgment was 
entered, the FCC actions never became "Final Orders" while the case was pending in the 
trial coi u t Agreement^ 2 ' 1 1 n is, 11 1 all events, on i indisputed fax: ts, I lokeiko's 
termination was timely and effective as a matter of law. 
Ignoring the Agreement's language, CTTC incorrectly asks the Court just to 
"infer" a different meaning for CTTC's construction of Paragraph 13. CTTC brief at 12. 
CTTC says t! lat tl I : • provision si louldbe i ead sucl I tl lat tl le FCC's Octobei 6 i i lling 
"materially alters" c ontracti ights, so "neither pai t;> could tei minate the Settleme fit 
Agreement unless and until the FCC approval, for whatever reason, was set aside." 
CTTC brief at 11, emphasis supplied. No such language appears in the Agreement. 
h CTTC's reading is grammatically flawed. 
CTTC' ultimately bases its eonslimtlion danns on an iiit/oiii'd leading ul thr 
phrase "if approved" and thr seniiroiun preceding il in Paragraph I 3, ( TT(' hi ief at 12; 
15-16. CTTC says that the semicolon should be read to divide "separate clauses" that 
should be construed independently to create what CTTC claims are "two alternative 
conditions for termination " CTTC brief at 16. CTTC is wrong for multiple reasons. 
First, CTTC's "reading" deprives tl ie pi irase "if approved'' of definition The 
initial portion of Paragraph 13 defines the approval as FCC appro\ al of "this Se ttlei iient 
Agreement, to grant the CTTC application, and to dismiss the competing applications 
within twelve months after the submission of the Joint Petition . . . . " Agreement 1f 13, 
emphasis supplied; R. 1179 < i,1 26 CTTC would read this out of the Agreement and put in 
termination right) to see whether finality would or would rise based on subsequent 
FCC and/or court proceedings. 
CTTC tried to skirt the temporal gap created by its reading, conjecturing that 
finality "is generally, a perfunctory matter" that can occur "about 45 days" after the initial 
FCC ruling. (R. 657.) CTTC's speculation and estimates, of course, are not found in the 
Agreement, and CTTC ignores the lengthy-perhaps years-long--proceedings (like the 
FCC proceedings in this case) contemplated by the Agreement.9 CTTC best illustrated 
this incorrect and unworkable aspect of its reading when it suggested that the trial court 
should go outside the Agreement and order an amendment to create a "reasonable" time 
period to address the "infinite" time problem: "If it's unreasonable, the Court can, I 
suppose, it can impose a reasonable provision into the agreement " R. 1179 at 76. 
The trial court correctly declined the invitation. See Webb v. R.O.A. General Inc.. 804 
P.2d 547, 551 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) ("Courts are not obligated to rewrite contracts 
entered into by parties dealing at arms' length, to relieve one party from a bargain later 
regretted simply on supposed equitable principles."). 
Second, CTTC's grammatical characterization is erroneous. A "clause" is the 
"combination of a complete subject with a complete predicate". See Wilma R. Ebbitt & 
David R. Ebbitt, Index to English 64 (6th ed. 1977). A semicolon may be used to link two 
9By engaging in such speculation, CTTC invites the Court to go outside the Agreement to 
consider extrinsic matter to divine CTTC's reading. CTTC renews its invitation to assume that 
finality is "generally, a perfunctory matter" and that "it is reasonable to infer" that the parties 
intended to be concerned with the timing of "approval" but not finality. CTTC brief at 13, 
emphasis supplied. Of course the Agreement makes no such distinction, but instead 
contemplates multiple post-ruling procedures, like petitions to reconsider to the FCC and court 
review, aimed at reversing the FCC rulings and rendering the finality issue moot. The 
Agreement anticipated such proceedings. Agreement f 2 (defining "Final Order"). 
"independent clauses" (clauses capable grammatically of standing alone as separate 
sentences), id. at 253. See also Id. at 64 (defining "independent clause," noting that 
"grammatically it can stand alone.") 
Here, language preceding the semicolon in Paragraph 13 (drafted by CTTC) is not 
even a complete sentence; it is a sentence fragment. See Id. at 137 ("A sentence fragment 
is a part of a sentence-usually a phrase or a dependent clause-that is carelessly or 
ineffectively punctuated as a whole sentence.") Only when the reader goes beyond the 
semicolon to the phrase "then either Party may terminate this Settlement Agreement," 
does a complete sentence emerge. Agreement 13. Thus, the semicolon is a grammatical 
error; it is employed as a simple comma. And when it is used as a comma, the language 
makes sense. Though Hokeiko established this in the trial court (R. 1179 at 24-25), 
CTTC does not address it in its principal brief. See e.g., McDougal v. Weed. 945 P.2d 
175,179 n.3 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)(declining to consider argument raised first in 
appellant's reply brief). 
In sum, under Paragraph 13, if "approval" and "Final Orders" had not occurred 
after twelve full months of FCC deliberation, the option to terminate arose. And even if 
FCC "approval" could occur after the twelve-month term, termination was available 
before the approval was effective or became a Final Order. In either event, Hokeiko's 
termination was proper, as the trial court correctly ruled. 
This answers all CTTC's contract-construction claims under Paragraph 13, 
including the claim that, as a matter of law, the trial court's ruling is unreasonable. CTTC 
( 
brief at 15.10 It also ends CTTC's speculation and requested "inferences" on its side-
i 
issues such as "material alteration" of rights, "perfunctory" finality, and "self-
termination." CTTC brief at 8-16.n Finally, it answers CTTC's speculation over the 
unspecified purposes of the 10-day notice term. CTTC brief at 14. This term is not ( 
expressed as a "grace period," empowering CTTC to "waive" a condition precedent (as 
shown below), or to "accept the termination," or "pressure the FCC to act." R. 658; .{ 
CTTC brief at 14. Under language it drafted, CTTC has no choice. Once a party 
terminates, the Agreement comes to an end in 10 days regardless of subsequent FCC 
action or the wishes of the other party. Agreement ^13. 
3. CTTC's "Estoppel" Theories Cannot Preclude Termination 
Unable to answer the Final-Order provision of the termination clause, CTTC 
suggests that summary judgment incorrectly deprived it of "an opportunity to present 
evidence at trial" to show that Hokeiko might be estopped from terminating for allegedly 
delaying FCC deliberations. CTTC brief at 24-25. CTTC misses the point. 
10Ignoring contract language and its grammatical error, CTTC now attacks the trial court 
directly, picking at out-of-context, misplaced in-court judicial statements and speculating 
(cautiously) that the "trial court appears to have rewritten the agreement." CTTC brief at 16. 
CTTC fails to point out that, before ruling, the trial court walked through each party's theory of 
construction from angles the parties requested, expressly aware that "the Court does not have the 
right to re-write the contract...." R. 1179 at 77. 
"This also ends CTTC's speculation concerning whether "IOV2 months" is sufficient for 
finality "[i]f the parties were genuinely concerned" about it. CTTC brief a 16. The Agreement 
itself expresses the parties' intent and concern. And CTTC did not question that FCC approval 
and Final Orders could easily issue within twelve months. A CTTC-related entity, Alpha & 
Omega Communications, LLC, believed that it was delaying the FCC's deliberations on the Joint 
Request by disputing an applicant's entitlement to an unrelated FCC permit. R. 507. 
First, CTTC utterly failed with its burden to produce evidence creating a fact 
question on "estoppel." Hokeiko moved for summary judgement on all claims. R. 467. 
This imposed on CTTC the well-understood duty to put forth admissible "evidence" it 
says shows "estoppel" in order to evade summary disposition. See State Bank of 
Southern Utah v. Trov Hvgro Svs.. Inc., 894 P.2d 1270, 1277 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), 
quoting First Sec. Fin, v. Okland Ltd.. Inc.. 750 P.2d 195, 197 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988)(affirming summary judgment on claims including estoppel and waiver, court noted 
that non-movants cannot rest on unsupported, bare contentions, and appellant "simply did 
not meet its burden of presenting some evidence, by affidavit or otherwise, raising a 
credible issue of material fact . . . .") 
CTTC did not conduct (and thus did not submit) any depositions of FCC personnel 
and put forth no FCC affidavits. Instead, as before, CTTC asks the Court simply to 
"infer" facts without evidence. It asks us to "infer" that the FCC's phone call to 
Hokeiko's counsel meant the FCC was prepared to rule or was really returning a 
heretofore unknown call from Hokeiko's lawyer; to "infer" that counsel's telephone 
statement to the FCC delayed FCC action; to "infer" that Hokeiko did all this "to 
perhaps" strike a better deal with an unknown third party; and to "infer" that, but for these 
still-unsubstantiated circumstances, the Agreement "could have been" approved as early 
as August 1997. CTC brief at 25. Speculation like this simply will not do. See State 
Bank of Southern Utah. 894 P.2d at 1277, quoting Thavne v. Beneficial Utah. Inc.. 874 
P.2d 120, 124 (Utah 1994)(party opposing summary judgment has "'an affirmative duty 
i 
to respond with affidavits or other materials allowed by rule 56(e) '"). 
i 
Second, CTTC's phone-contact bases for "estoppel" are unpreserved grounds. In 
the trial court, CTTC did not brief the phone-contact allegations as grounds for estoppel. 
R. 659. CTTC urged (but has abandoned on appeal) a claim that Hokeiko was estopped 
instead for following FCC rules allowing Hokeiko's petition for reconsideration, which 
CTTC said was the "only reason that the FCC order did not become a [FJinal [Ojrder . . . < 
." R. 659.12 CTTC overlooked the weeks-long period during which the FCC decision 
already existed as a non-Final Order and the fact that the petition did not change the 
i 
decision's status. Cannon v. Stevens Sch. of Bus., Inc.. 560 P.2d 1383, 1385 (Utah 
1977). Finally, CTTC did not explain how Hokeiko couM be estopped by availing itself 
of procedures anticipated by the Agreement's "Final Order" definition. Agreement f 2. 
Thus, the prevention doctrine (which CTTC casts here as "estoppel"), does not apply to 
Hokeiko because the doctrine "is inapplicable when the conduct alleged to have ' 
prevented performance was permissible under either the express or the implied terms of 
the contract." Samuel Williston & Richard A. Lord, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts § 
39:11 (4th ed. 2000); see also District-Realty Title Ins. Corp. v. Ensmann. 767 F.2d 1018, 
1023 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (holding that because the plaintiff had assumed the risk of 
12Because CTTC did not frame its "estoppel" claim in the trial court as it does on appeal, 
the lack of admissible evidence of estoppel was not squarely argued. Still, CTTC's evidentiary 
failure on summary judgment supplies an alternative basis to affirm. See Higgins v. Salt Lake 
County, 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993) (noting "we may affirm a grant of summary judgment on 
any ground available to the trial court, even if it is one not relied on below."); Hill v. Seattle First 
Nat!l Bank, 827 P.2d 241, 246 (Utah 1992) (court may affirm summary judgment on "any 
reasonable legal basis" finding support in the record, even if it was not relied upon below.) 
nonsettlement the defendant did not "prevent" settlement from occurring). Summary 
judgment for Hokeiko was proper. 
4. CTTC Cannot Waive "Finality." a Right Also Belonging to Hokeiko. 
CTTC also challenges Hokeiko's termination before Final Orders arose, arguing 
that the finality term existed only for CTTC's benefit and that it "waived" the term, 
depriving Hokeiko of the right to terminate. CTTC brief at 21. This "waiver" defense 
does not help CTTC because it ignores the other alternative bases for termination and it is 
grounded on a faulty premise: "finality" was not CTTC's alone to waive. 
The Final-Order term of Paragraph 13 conferred a valuable termination right on 
Hokeiko and CTTC. Agreement ^ 13 (noting that if certain time-conditioned FCC 
actions "do not become Final Orders, then either Party may terminate this Settlement 
Agreement ")(emphasis supplied). CTTC is inconsistent on this point. Though 
CTTC claims it is the sole beneficiary of the "finality" term, it concedes elsewhere that 
"the termination rights under f^ 13 belong to both parties." CTTC brief at 15; R. 784. In 
the end, the plain language confirms dual beneficiaries.13 And because the term 
benefitted both parties, must waive it; CTTC could not do it alone. See e.g., Hanson v. 
Moeller. 376 N.W.2d 220, 225 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985)(holding that both buyers and 
sellers were required to waive financing contingency that benefitted both groups); 
13The express language of the "either party" term is clear and unambiguous. "Where [] * 
the express language of the contract unambiguously indicates that a term protects both parties, 
extrinsic evidence will be inadmissible to show that a contract term or condition was inserted 
only to protect the party alleged to have waived the protection." Williston on Contracts. § 39:24 
(4*6(1.2000). 
Williston & Lord at § 39:24 ("[W]aiver of contract requirements and conditions may not 
be made unilaterally where the waiver would deprive the non-waiving party of a benefit 
under the provision in question.") 
Hokeiko did not waive the finality term and narrow its termination rights.14 Thus, 
while CTTC could-for itself-waive finality as a precondition to its payment under 
paragraph 3, CTTC could not waive the Final-Order term of the termination clause with 
rights Hokeiko held. See Hanson. 376 N.W.2d at 225; Miracle Constr. Co., v. Miller, 87 
N.W.2d 665, 670 (Minn. 1958)("[A] party may waive a condition precedent to his own 
performance of a contractual duty, when such condition precedent exits for his sole 
benefit and protection, and compel performance by the other party who has no interest in 
the performance or nonperformance of such condition.") Hokeiko retained its termination 
rights and invoked them. 
Further, the finality term of Paragraph 3 (again, written by CTTC) is not just a 
condition of payment for CTTC or of termination by "either Party." It is also a 
precondition to the validity of the Agreement in toto, as noted above. On its face, this 
term plainly involved rights benefitting both Hokeiko and CTTC. Like the finality term 
of Paragraph 13, it was not CTTC's right alone to "waive" finality under Paragraph 3 in 
an attempt to validate the Agreement and impair Hokeiko's rights. 
14Similarly., just by entering into the Settlement Agreement with the much-discussed do-
not "impede" term (see Agreement If 4), Hokeiko did not waive its right to employ federal FCC 
rules and petition for reconsideration, as Judge Iwasaki previously held. R. 196 (ruling that 
"Hokeiko did not waive its right to file a petition for reconsideration before the Federal 
Communications Commission ("FCC") when it entered into the Settlement Agreement dated 
December 14, 1995 with CTTC"). CTTC has not appealed this. 
In sum, on multiple grounds, Hokeiko was entitled as a matter of law to renew 
prosecution of its application under terms CTTC drafted. CTTC's claims stop here. 
IV, CTTC's Pre-termination "Breach" Claim Is Insufficient as a Matter of 
Law. 
CTTC incorrectly argues that, even if Hokeiko's termination was proper, Hokeiko 
twice breached the shall-not-impede-or-frustrate provision of Paragraph 4 of the 
Agreement. CTTC brief at 17. Hokeiko does not dispute CTTC's authorities involving 
pre-termination breach. However, CTTC is wrong because there was no evidence that 
Hokeiko's alleged actions impeded or frustrated "the eventual grant of the CTTC 
application."15 Summary judgment was proper. 
CTTC casts the following as Hokeiko's breaches: (1) the FCC's (Ms. Ayers') 
August 1997 telephone call to Hokeiko's FCC counsel and counsel's responses; and (2) 
Hokeiko's October 8 notice to Ms. Ayers of Hokeiko's termination and filing Hokeiko's 
Withdrawal Notice. Even assuming CTTC's characterization of events, CTTC's claims 
fail for lack of evidence. 
CTTC failed to establish by the affidavit or deposition of Ms. Ayers, or any other 
FCC staffer, that Ms. Ayers, at any time, inferred from Hokeiko's counsel or otherwise, a 
basis to impede or delay any FCC action; that Ms. Ayers had authority to delay events; 
15CTTC says the trial court "made no attempt to resolve" this "collateral" issue (CTTC 
brief at 17), ignoring the trial court's conclusion: "I don't think there's sufficient evidence here 
that the contract was impeded under Paragraph 4." (R. 1179 at 81.) CTTC also implies that 
discovery of attorney billing records "could have" shed some light on events (CTTC brief at 19), 
ignoring that it told the trial court that the discovery was not necessary to address summary 
judgment. R. 1179 at 9, 13-14. 
that Ms. Ayers presents applications to others in the FCC; that if Ms. Ayers presents 
applications to others, she delayed presenting the parties' submissions; that Ms. Ayers 
passed any information to others at the FCC who actually make the approval decisions; or 
that the decision makers understood from anything done by Hokeiko that there was a 
basis to delay or impede approval. Most importantly-after all is said and done-CTTC 
advanced no evidence indicating that, in fact, from the first phone message to FCC 
approval (which was eventually granted), the FCC's processing of the parties' 
submissions was impeded or frustrated or slowed for a single second by Hokeiko. 
CTTC's evidentiary failure is exceptional for alleged "breaches" after the FCC's 
August telephone call. If we assume that the FCC granted CTTC's application on 
October 6, 1997, as CTTC claims, any subsequent effort to "impede or frustrate" the FCC 
grant before terminating would be a temporal impossibility.16 Not surprisingly, CTTC 
conceded below that it did not seek summary judgment on this breach claim, saying: "we 
know that we don't have the evidentiary basis to pursue summary judgment." R. 1179 at 
75. 
Ignoring this, and relying on bare contentions with no evidence of its own, CTTC 
incorrectly argues that the trial court again should have just "inferred" that the alleged 
contact delayed or frustrated the FCC's actions. CTTC brief at 19. CTTC did not and 
can not carry its burden on summary judgment with this. See e ^ , State Bank of Southern 
16Hokeiko has not taken a contrary position on this in the FCC or elsewhere, contrary to 
what CTTC implies. See CTTC brief at 20. 
Utah. 894 P.2d at 1277, quoting Thavne v. Beneficial Utah. Inc.. 874 P.2d 120,124 (Utah 
1994)(party opposing summary judgment has "'an affirmative duty to respond with 
affidavits or other materials allowed by rule 56(e). . . . ' " ) ; Warwick v. Matheney. 603 
So.2d 330, 336 (Miss. 1992) ("[I]n any suit for breach of contract," the plaintiff has the 
burden to prove the existence of a contract, breach, and damages). 
In sum, CTTC's "breach" claim did not preclude summary judgment for Hokeiko 
and fails as a matter of law. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above alternative reasons, this Court should affirm the trial court which 
correctly granted Hokeiko's motions for summary judgment and denied CTTC's cross-
motion. 
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